

ANDRÉS MÉNDEZ RUIZ

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate, Economics, University of Texas at Austin, May 2020 (Expected)
Dissertation Title: *“Essays on Inter-firm Contracting”*
M.S., Economics, University of Texas at Austin, 2017
M.S., Econometrics, University of Amsterdam, 2014
M.S., Economics, El Colegio de México, 2012
B.A., Philosophy, Universidad de Guadalajara, 2009

REFERENCES

Daniel Akerberg (Co-Chair)
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
512-475-9538
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Eugenio Miravete (Co-Chair)
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
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Sheila Olmstead
LBJ School of Public Affairs
University of Texas at Austin
512-471-2064
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Jorge Balat
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
512-475-7353
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TEACHING AND RESEARCH FIELDS

Fields: Industrial Organization, Econometrics
Sub-Fields: Energy and Environmental Economics

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS

2019 – 2020	Adam Smith Fellowship, Mercatus Center
2019 – 2020	Human Studies Fellowship, Institute for Humane Studies
Summer, 2019	PERC Graduate Fellowship, Property and Environment Research Center
2014 – 2019	CONACYT Doctoral Scholarship, Mexico’s National Council of Science and Technology
2014 – 2015	Supplementary Doctoral Scholarship, Mexican Secretariat of Public Education
2013 – 2014	Amsterdam Merit Scholarship, University of Amsterdam
Fall, 2011	Excelencia Colmex Award, El Colegio de México
Fall, 2010	Excelencia Colmex Award, El Colegio de México
2010 – 2012	CONACTY Master’s Degree Scholarship, Mexico’s National Council of Science and Technology

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT

2018 – 2019	University of Texas at Austin, Energy Institute, Research Assistant for Professor Carey King
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2017 – 2018	University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, Research Assistant for Professor Jorge Balat
2012 – 2013	Mexican Federal Competition Commission, Assistant Manager at the General Division for Planning and Evaluation
Summer, 2011	Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme, Research Intern

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Fall, 2019	Structural Econometrics, University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Professor Daniel Akerberg
2017-2018	Industrial Organization, University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Professors David S. Sibley and Eugenio Miravete
Fall, 2016	Introduction to Econometrics, University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Professor Stephen Trejo
Fall, 2014	Applied Industrial Organization and Network Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Professor Neil Gandal

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

July, 2019	The Bakken Conference and Expo
February, 2019	UT Energy Week 2019, The University of Texas at Austin
July, 2018	Jerusalem Summer School of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
October, 2018	Fifth Annual Conference on Transportation, Economics, Energy and the Environment (TE3), University of Michigan
Winter, 2012	Antitrust Workshop, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexican Federal Competition Commission and International Chamber of Commerce

WORKING PAPERS

“Coase on Fire: Regulation and the Adoption of Natural Gas Flaring Abatement Technology in North Dakota” (*Job Market Paper*)

Unconventional fossil fuel extraction technology and favorable market conditions ignited an oil production boom in North Dakota. At its onset, around 2008, the state lacked enough pipeline infrastructure to capture all the associated natural gas extracted jointly with oil, resulting in large volumes of flared natural gas. In this context, I investigate the role of contracting costs in hindering firm cooperation to construct pipelines, thus preventing firms from fully harnessing available mutual economies of scale. To do so, I model firms' well connection decisions as a static complete information game in which producers decide what fraction of their wells to connect, while considering the effect of externalities from other firms' actions on their connection costs. I measure the extent of inter-firm contracting costs with respect to a benchmark case in which all wells are owned by a single firm, and thus contracting costs are assumed to be zero. I also use my model to study what the investment outcome would be if contracting was costless. Finally, I compute a counterfactual to find what flaring penalty would approximate the outcome that would prevail if there were no contracting costs.

OTHER

Languages: English (fluent), French (intermediate), German (fluent), and Spanish (native)